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John Rink, ed. The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical 
Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Reviewed by Robert S. Hatten 
This superb collection of twelve essays highlights the emergence of 
a field of music theory broadly labeled as "performance studies" in 
England, although its widely divergent studies go far beyond what one 
might initially associate with performance from the perspective of the 
studio. Several new fields of music theory are represented in this rather 
diverse collection, and many of our leading theorists are gathered to 
help map the territory. 
The last four essays are written by theorists who also excel as 
performers (Joel Lester, William Rothstein, Edward T. Cone, and John 
Rink), and not surprisingly, they address the relationship between 
(critical) analysis and performance. Lester underlines the contribution 
that performance can make to the analytical process, rather than 
assuming performance to be merely the beneficiary of prior analysis. 
Rothstein elucidates the art of projecting one's analytical insights 
without being pedantic or overly didactic about it, and he joins Lester 
in urging a synthesis of the insights to be gained from analysis and 
performance. Cone's essay focuses on the critical aspect of performers' 
choices, with attention to tempo decisions as they affect a performer's 
expressive and formal conceptions of the work. John Rink, the editor 
of these essays, takes a reverse perspective in the concluding study, 
pursuing a close analysis of the score after having performed Brahms's 
Fantasien, Op. 116, ostensibly in order to reconstruct and critique his 
intuitive analytical framework and choices. 
The middle four essays, by Nicolas Cook, David Epstein, Janet 
Levy, and Ronald Woodley, are studies of the consequences for 
performance of particular kinds of musical meaning. Cook justifies 
Furtwangler's tempo fluctuations in his recordings of the first 
movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in light of the conductor's 
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knowledge of Schenker's monograph on the symphony and his concept 
of structural spans. Epstein, Levy, and Woodley each focus on a single 
perspective on meaning, exploring its consequences for performance. 
Epstein treats affective meaning in the first movement of Schumann's 
Fourth Symphony; Levy, ambiguous openings and closings in works by 
Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven; and Woodley, irony in Prokofiev's 
Violin Sonata in F minor, Op. 80. 
The initial four essays are not as cohesive a section as those that 
follow, though they might loosely be construed as addressing 
"Fundamentals," the general heading bestowed by Rink. Roy Howat's 
eloquent introduction to the problems of notation and the theories by 
which we disambiguate it contains many specific solutions for 
interpretative problems and clarifies several cases of misleading 
editorial practices. Ralf Th. Krampe and K. Anders Ericsson round out 
the section with the kind of study familiar to American scholarship 
from the field of music education, treating the importance of 
"deliberate practice" to the gradual acquisition of elite performing 
abilities, with studies of young, middle-aged, and older performers. 
It is the middle two essays of this section that offer perhaps the 
most significant new insights, addressing in turn two important and 
just-emerging fields of research: Eric Clarke essays a semiotic and 
cognitive study of expression in performance (the subtle variations in 
pacing and dynamics that have profound rhetorical effects and reflect 
higher-level analytical choices on the part of a performer); and Patrick 
Shove and Bruno H. Repp survey studies of musical motion conceived 
not (merely) as traditionally-analyzed directional or expectational forces 
generated by melodic and harmonic progression, but as "literal" 
expressive movement embodied in the musical gesture. 
What is not represented in the collection is historical performance 
practice. Although several authors compare or critique recordings from 
earlier in this century, there is clearly an analytical bias to the 
collection (Are historical musicologists less reliable performers or 
merely too "specialized" in their approach? Are performers on 
authentic instruments less qualified to contribute analytically?). I would 
have enjoyed the inclusion of essays by Neal Zaslaw, to name just one 
musicologist who also conducts and teaches style to performers, and 
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Malcolm Bilson, to name just one performer who is deeply involved in 
historical and analytical issues in his teaching. 1 And it would have been 
interesting to have included an essay by Richard Taruskin, along the 
lines of his "Resisting the Ninth,"2 to stir the pot a bit. As it is, none 
of the critical recommendations for performance says much that a 
theorist or performer would find controversial, and while the authors 
say it extraordinarily well (with solid historical credentials), I wished 
that more attention had been given to problematic issues in historical 
performance. 
Another area that might have been represented is how one teaches 
performance. I do not mean pedagogy in the standard sense of learning 
the technique and repertoire of an instrument, but rather approaches 
such as that developed by Alexandra Pierce, which incorporates 
movement, character embodiment, and Schenkerian analysis in 
performance.3 Pierce's most recent article features an exemplary 
description of methods that can work with college students who are 
physically disconnected from the act of performance, or who are unable 
to translate analytical insights into sufficiently natural shapings and 
shadings in their voice or instrument. 
On the positive side, the essays dealing with aspects of musical 
meaning and their projection in performance are both timely and of 
considerable interest. My review concentrates more on speculations 
IPor representative essays by Zaslaw and Bilson, see Peiformance Practice: Music 
After 1600, ed. Howard Mayer Brown and Stanley Sadie, The Norton/Grove Handbooks 
in Music (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 207-22 and 223-38, respectively. 
2This and Taruskin's other essays on performance are collected in revised form in 
his Text and Act: Essays on Music and Peiformance (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995). 
3Por the most recent, comprehensive exposition of her approach, see Alexandra 
Pierce, "Developing Schenkerian Hearing and Performing," Integral 8 (1994): 51-123. 
Pierce and I also gave a demonstration of several of her exercises designed to help a 
more advanced pianist not only project but actually discover an analytically and 
artistically effective interpretation (evening session on "Musical Microstructure in 
Expressive Performance," chaired by David Lidov, at the 1995 Society for Music 
Theory conference in New York). 
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raised by the chapters on ambiguity and irony than on a complete 
reconstruction of the authors' analyses; and throughout, my approach 
is generally geared toward extending discussion and promoting healthy 
debate about issues that these excellent essays have provoked in my 
own thinking. Since I will not offer a systematic or comprehensive 
accounting of every author's contribution, let me state that I 
recommend the entire book warmly, that the essays are of a uniformly 
high quality, and that each deserves the reader's careful attention. 
"Beginning-Ending Ambiguity: Consequences of Performance 
Choices" 
Janet Levy's essay on ambiguity echoes concerns throughout the 
book (Howat, Lester, Rothstein, and Rink4) for keeping viable a 
multitude of interpretive possibilities, rather than for resolving in favor 
of a single interpretation in performance. Levy is concerned with what 
one might call functional ambiguities (William Thomson's termS) that, 
according to Levy, are part of the "composer's plan" (154) and should 
be "enhanced" (157) in performance. Levy distinguishes ambiguity 
from vagueness and provides a temporal dimension in constructing her 
definition: "a musical situation is ambiguous if at the same time, or 
very close in time, it gives rise to two or more specifiable [italics mine] 
meanings" (152). Her examples include such famous cases as the trio 
from the minuet of Mozart's "Jupiter" symphony, which begins with 
a cadence that throws off the expected hypermetric grouping. The 
cadence figure must be heard to function both as the beginning of the 
trio and as an echo of the ending of the minuet. Thus, neither the 
4Another exponent of this position is Janet Schmalfe1dt, whose excellent article, "On 
the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven's Bagatelles Op. 126, nos. 2 and 5," 
Journal of Music Theory 29, no. 1 (1985): 1-31, is one of the early studies most often 
cited by authors in this collection. Her exciting demonstration and performance of the 
two works at the 1984 Society for Music Theory conference in New Haven should also 
be mentioned. 
5William Thomson, "Functional Ambiguity in Musical Structures," Music 
Perception 1, no. 1 (1983): 3-27. 
Book Reviews 91 
beginning nor the end of the cadence figure can be marked by a 
ritardando or articulation, or the balance between the two 
interpretations would shift. The best interpretation, ironically, would 
seem to be the one that recognizes both functions by relinquishing any 
attempt to bring either one out. As Levy puts it, "the simplest of 
performance nuances has a higher-level consequence: it weakens the 
double entendre at a nodal moment-return-in Mozart's play" (160). 
Rothstein (his essay is discussed below) similarly recommends 
keeping two different hypermetric options in a Chopin waltz in a state 
of suspension, to allow the listener "to entertain both possibilities" 
(236). His solution is not a neutral performance, however, but rather 
a calculated series of departures from the "main" hypermeter to its 
competing or "shadow" hypermeter,6 such that the main hypermeter 
is never completely lost, but artfully ambiguated (Rink suggests much 
the same in his essay, 276). 
For Levy and Rothstein, though, the issue lies in how best to 
convey an ambiguity in performance, not in whether or not such a 
situation is indeed ambiguous in the sense of undecidability or 
indeterminacy. Recently, Kofi Agawu has argued that ambiguity of the 
sort we associate with undecidability is problematic for tonal music: 
"1 hope to [show], not that multiple meanings do not exist in tonal 
music (how could they not?) but that, once the enabling constructs of 
music theory are brought into play, equivocation disappears.,,7 
Although Levy cites Agawu only in passing as an example of 
"relatively recent attention to the subject of musical ambiguity treated 
more broadly [than metric/rhythmic ambiguity]" (151, note 5), her 
definition of musical ambiguity as two competing but "specifiable" 
meanings only partially evades Agawu's comprehensively and 
6Rothstein notes that the term "shadow meter" is a creation of Frank Samarotto's, 
stemming from a paper, "Strange Dimensions: RegUlarity and Irregularity in Deep 
Levels of Rhythmic Reduction," delivered to the Second International Schenker 
Symposium held in New York in 1992. 
7Kofi Agawu, "Ambiguity in Tonal Music: A Preliminary Study," in Theory, 
Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 88. 
92 Indiana Theory Review, Vol. 17/1 
persuasively argued position, summarized in four propositions: 
1 Theory-based analysis necessarily includes a mechanism for 
resolving ambiguities at all levels of structure; 
2 An analysis that terminates in undecidability represents a 
conscious or subconscious retreat from theory; 
3 While ambiguity may exist as an abstract phenomenon, it does 
not exist in concrete musical situations; 
4 In situations of competing meanings, the alternatives are always 
formed hierarchically, making all such situations decidable 
without denying the existence of multiple meanings.8 
Levy's ambiguity is not undecidable in its components for the 
theorist or performer' 'in the know, " or for the style-competent listener 
who may quickly sort out the initial confusion into two or more strands 
of meaning. But for her, the competing meanings need not always be 
ranked (Agawu' s fourth proposition) and thus tilted toward one 
solution, as in Rothstein's example of main and shadow hypermeters, 
where the main hypermeter, like a boxer, wins a close decision in its 
bout. Indeed, if ambiguity can serve as a compositional premise (and 
I agree with Levy and Rothstein that it can), then its components, while 
specifiable or decidable as to junction, need not be ranked by hierarchy 
or be decidable as to priority in performance, in every case. As Levy 
proposes, in the case of simultaneous or overlapping yet distinguishable 
formal functions, "If a listener is to be enabled to experience the 
pleasurable functions of such ambiguities, the performer must convey 
both functions as fully as possible" (167). 
But we are left to ponder when such cases of ' 'parametric 
noncongruence" are sufficiently marked as to trigger Agawu's stronger 
type of ambiguity. Agawu argues that "parametrical noncongruence 
8Ibid., 107. 
Book Reviews 93 
appears to be the inescapable condition of any expressive art,' ,9 yet the 
layers are weighted such that we can decide on one as primary, and the 
performer must, in any case, choose one way and play it with 
conviction. 10 But the performer is not so handicapped as to have to 
choose between bringing out only one of two functions. Levy's 
discussion of two performances of the Mozart Symphony in G minor, 
no. 40, demonstrates a third possibility. The passage is the 
recapitulation of the first movement, with its extended motivic upbeat 
that throws the point of melodic return off one bar from the point of 
harmonic arrival. Reiner plays it straight; Szell marks the point of 
harmonic arrival with a ritard and articulative break just before it. Levy 
recommends Reiner's performance over Szell's because "the listener 
is allowed the pleasure of experiencing the ambiguity as it unfolds, as 
well as the sense that he or she has discovered it" (165). Unlike 
Agawu's recommendation, then, "choosing not to choose" (Reiner's 
approach) can be a valid option that actually preserves the experience 
of ambiguity unfolding in time. But, to return to Agawu's point, is this 
kind of parametric noncongruence really ambiguity (in his richer sense 
of the term, as derived from linguistic practice)? Might one hear the 
return as simply "spread out" over time, and experience simply a 
non-ambiguous sense of "stretching"? 
Furthermore, if ambiguity as premise depends on stylistic 
understanding, how does one convey "good" ambiguity as 
distinguished from "bad" undecidability or confusion, especially to a 
modern audience? We have probably all had the experience of hearing 
an unknown piece metrically wrong due to a cross-accentual pattern 
(especially when tuning into the middle of a work on the car radio!). 
That sense of unresolved ambiguity is usually uncomfortable, and only 
rarely might it be considered' 'functional" or compositionally induced. 
9Ibid., 100-101. 
lorbid., 98. Agawu also cites Bruce Campbell's review of Levy's book, Beethoven's 
Compositional Choices: The Two Versions of Opus 18, No.1, First Movement 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), appearing in Journal of Music 
Theory 29, no. 1 (1985), in which Campbell also baldly asserts that "ambiguity in music 
does not really exist" (193). 
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How, then, can ambiguity as a premise be aesthetically satisfying? 
What, in other words, are the (stylistic or perceptual) constraints on 
intentionally ambiguous formations in given styles? 
"Strategies of Irony in Prokofiev's Violin Sonata in F minor, Ope 
80" 
If ambiguity in music appears troublesome, both to define and to 
convey in performance, consider the thorny problem of interpreting 
irony in music. Ronald Woodley's essay on Prokofiev is admirable in 
its scope, drawing on Schlegel's concept of Romantic irony and 
Bakhtin's notion of diologism in the novel ("a self-conscious game that 
dramatizes the gap between what is told and the telling of it"ll). 
Prokofiev's Violin Sonata in F minor is presumably "about" a 
frustration of desire, produced by "blockage" that seeks release to a 
"pure, un[-]ironic state" (171). Also notable is the author's sensitive 
critique of five performances of the work with respect to gestural 
nuances, as these relate to the ironizing narrative that he suggests. 
Although the political context and personal reminiscences provide 
strong evidence for Prokofiev's ironic intentions, I find the ascription 
of irony to particular voice-leading and accentual details a sudden leap 
into less theoretically established territory. 
The ironic depends, one would assume, on a particular intentionality 
being cued with respect to the musical material. One might define irony 
as a bracketing or framing of musical discourse, such that it receives 
a negation of sincerity, leading at times to a trope that might constitute 
a "perspective" or "worldview." In this sense, negation of sincerity 
need not translate into negativity in terms of affect-the results might 
range from the light-heartedly comic or playful to the bitter or 
sardonic. If music can in some way cue the bracketing, then the 
problem, it would seem, is to determine just how that bracketing should 
be construed-which is a matter of determining the intentional stance 
of, if not the composer, at least a higher-level persona whose power is 
llL. Bishop, Romantic Irony in French Literature from Diderot to Beckett (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1989), 205, as quoted by Woodley, 171. 
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revealed in the very act of "commenting upon" or creating a particular 
perspective in relation to the base-line discourse of a musical passage 
or work. The composer's intentions are, of course, the default position 
in ascribing ironic self-consciousness to a musical work, but more 
interesting are those cases where the composer can write into the work 
a duality of levels, whereby what happens to the prevailing discourse 
is charged with a sense of its contradiction with respect to meaning. 
It may well be that certain terms of the discourse are "pre-set" in 
their ironic construal. For Prokofiev, Woodley maintains that the 
diatonic is in dialectical opposition to the chromatic, with the latter 
often providing the "defamiliarization" (the Russian Formalists' term 
for poetic markedness, appropriated by Woodley solely for the trope of 
irony), and the former offering "a metaphor for the unattainable 
sublime" (172-73). 
But what are the governing constraints on ironic interpretation of the 
details? There are perhaps two issues here. First, against which norms 
do we measure "deformation, " such that certain developmental 
techniques "count" as signalling the ironic? Second, according to 
which cultural competencies do we ascribe the appropriate genre (high 
comedy, low comedy, high tragedy, low tragedy or grotesque), the 
degree of personal involvement (gritty directness or cosmic aloofness), 
and the affectual character (light-heartedly playful, bitterly sardonic) of 
that ironically marked discourse? Are there ways to establish an 
appropriate dramatic or narrative framework for interpreting irony in 
this way, or is irony too slippery to be pinned down in a definitive 
interpretation? Might irony be a side product at times, rather than the 
central premise of a musical work, and if so, how might we know? 
Could irony be ambiguous in a functional way?12 
In my book on musical meaning I noted the inherent insecurities of 
ironic interpretation and how listeners can easily fail to follow the 
121 should note at this point the dissertation-in-progress of a music semiotic colleague 
in Edinburgh, Scotland-Esti Sheinberg-who is attempting to provide, for 
Shostakovich's style, a theoretical framework for distinguishing the ironic modes of 
simple irony, parody, satire, and the grotesque, all of which she considers as 
embodiments of semantic ambiguity(!) (personal communication). 
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creative torsion of tropes in general. 13 I also proposed a thorough 
grounding of tropes in stylistic correlations (established music-structural 
or processual "types"-as opposed to unique "tokens"-that have 
established "correlations" with meaningful cultural units, or semantic 
"types"). If we are theoretically more secure at the more "literal" 
levels of musical meaning, then we can venture more confidently into 
the more "figurative" or creative levels of musical meaning, where 
undoubtedly our greatest aesthetic interest lies. In turn, the performance 
decisions involved in projecting ambiguity would surely profit from an 
understanding of the tropological significance of any ambiguous 
passage, and irony is merely one of many possibilities. 
Yet even if we can succeed in projecting ambiguity in performance, 
is there any guarantee that we can project an attendant irony when the 
listener is not predisposed to interpret the work in that way? For 
Prokofiev, the problem might not seem so acute, since the twentieth 
century is in some ways a more psychologically troubled extension of 
the age of irony, documented in its emergence by Friedrich Schlegel 
before the nineteenth century began (and Woodley is well aware of 
Schegel's contribution). Whereas musical discourse without specific 
ironic cueing might still be taken at face value (Le., sincerely) in the 
nineteenth century, the fact of a work's being composed in the 
twentieth century is often enough to place an ironic marker on even the 
most straightforward of musical discourses. (After Eric Satie and Virgil 
Thomson, can a minimalist composition ever escape a certain 
tongue-in-cheek quality?) It is perhaps only the contextualizing sincerity 
of such spiritually committed composers as Arvo Part that may suspend 
the at-times cynical supposition of ironic frames by classical listeners 
attuned to the characteristic trope of the times. 
Let us turn, then, to an apparently safer realm of interpretation, that 
which leads to temporal choices and modifications in performance. 
Several authors deal with tempo, rubato, and timing as fundamental 
choices by a performer attempting to enhance the expressive character 
13Robert S. Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and 
Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 172-88. 
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of a work or to clarify its formal structure (or the former by means of 
the latter, since the expressive and the structural are inextricably 
intertwined) . 
"The Pianist as Critic" 
Edward T. Cone demonstrates the importance of "absolute tempo" 
in examples ranging from the opening chorus of the St. Matthew 
Passion (where a too-slow tempo had in the past distorted the form of 
a chorale-fantasy), to the Chopin Impromptu, Op. 66 (where a too-fast 
tempo for the opening obscures its motivic relationship to the middle 
section) (246-47) . An extended example details the importance of 
"relative tempo" for the song-form and trio sections of Schubert's 
Impromptu in Ab major, Op. 142, no. 2. Although Schubert does not 
give a different tempo indication for the trio, nor does he provide an 
indication of ritard in the transition to the reprise, the four recorded 
performances surveyed by Cone each shift in tempo from around MM 
100-108 to MM 132-144 (per quarter). This relationship of relative 
tempi obscures, for Cone, an important connection between the two 
sections: they each feature agogic accents on the second beat, a 
rhythmic dissonance that reaches a climax in the trio but is resolved in 
favor of the meter only by the song-form first section. Cone's solution 
is not to slow down the trio by much (MM 126 is his minimum) but 
rather to speed up the first section to match it, thereby achieving a truer 
Allegretto for the first section and bringing out the motivic connections 
between the two parts. 
One can test his recommendation at the piano, or gauge for oneself 
whether or not the agogic connection is missed in recorded 
performances where the tempo shifts. At first I found the opening at 
Cone's proposed tempo a bit too rushed for its "character" (pastoral, 
with the doubled inner pedal; and requiring a slight bit of time to set 
off the agogic accent). And I continue to find the motivic connection 
between sections obvious enough not to require the same tempo as 
reinforcement. On the other hand, the absence of a notated tempo 
change by Schubert (who, as Cone points out, is careful to include 
them in other trios) is historical evidence more compelling to me than 
the analytical connections Cone adduces to clinch the case. My first 
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inclination, after experimenting at the piano, was to move the tempi 
closer together by slowing down the trio, rather than speeding up the 
first section, and not to insist on an exactness that would perhaps sound 
more dutiful than natural. But after experimenting some more, I found 
I could play the first section very close to MM 126 and still bring out 
its pastoral and agogic character, with the added benefit of a more 
characteristic dance-like flow. Thus, whereas I might not agree with all 
aspects of Cone's critical argument, it certainly served its purpose in 
leading me to reconsider my choice of tempo and to discover ways to 
make a less-familiar tempo work without sacrificing the values of a 
more accustomed one. Indeed, unless a performer can negotiate the 
gestural character of a section at a prescribed new tempo, it is unlikely 
that the new tempo will be an improvement, regardless of the relative 
temporal values it achieves. 
"The Conductor and the Theorist: FUrlwiingler, Schenker, and the 
First Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony" 
A more controversial and much freer approach to tempo is found in 
the live recordings of the conductor Wilhelm Furtwangler. His 
performances of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony are, in Nicholas Cook's 
view, "no more . . . arbitrary and subjective than Schenker's theories 
of musical structure" (108). Cook's essay traces Furtwangler's study 
with Schenker, and his study of Schenker's monograph on the Ninth 
Symphony, as significant influences on the conductor's approach to 
tempo fluctuation in his 1951 and 1953 recordings of the Ninth. A 
basic principle underlying many conductors' approach is that the length 
of caesuras or the extent of rallentandos is directly proportional to the 
importance of the structural division they highlight (117). Whereas 
Cook notes that such practice was common between the wars, he 
demonstrates that Furtwangler's "tempo gradients," each of which 
functions as a "nuance expanded to the level of a complete thematic 
statement" (117), are distinctive to his style and playas important a 
role as fixed tempi. Furthermore, not only do sustained (extended) 
rallentandos occur, but sustained accelerandos do as well (118). Cook 
argues that the continuous flux of these tempo gradients can offer a new 
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level of structuring in performance: 
[Tempo gradients] embrace extended passages of music within 
a single span, and give rise to structural divisions when one arch 
succeeds another. And these structural properties function quite 
independently of local rallentandos or caesuras. (119) 
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Local rallentandos or caesuras in Furtwangler's performances function 
rhetorically, and despite their momentary deflection, they do not 
obscure the overall arch of a dynamically changing tempo, which 
continues to function structurally. 
Because of this hierarchical distinction of rhetorical and structural 
tempo modifications, Furtwangler's extremes always appear to have a 
purpose, as opposed to the rubatos in Mengelberg's 1940 recording, in 
which different tempi are juxtaposed without transition, reducing the 
symphony to a series of episodes. Thus, while we might at first find 
Furtwangler's tempo fluctuations extreme, they are highly motivated 
structurally and are not subject to the criticism leveled against' 'rubato 
conductors" (120). Furthermore, 
Because they create the sense of a destination, because of their 
gestural coherence, Furtwangler's dynamic tempo profiles 
convey the same organisation of the music into large spans that 
Schenker strove to express in his analyses. (120) 
The subsequent section of Cook's essay demonstrates how in one case 
Furtwangler's implied analysis may even have improved upon 
Schenker's monograph analysis. A concluding section reports the 
conductor's own insightful remarks about using variation in tempo to 
project "an experience of conception and growth, of a living organic 
process," and its inspiration in Wagner's approach to Beethoven. 14 
14Wilhelm Furtwangler, "Beethoven for Today," in Furtwiingler on Music: Essays 
and Addresses, ed. and trans. Ronald Taylor (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), 36, cited 
by Cook, 122. 
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"Analysis and the Act of Performance" 
The question one might still ask, after this masterful apologia for 
intelligently motivated tempo modification, is why taste might have 
changed-why we do not find Furtwangler's style of performance as 
convincing or attractive today. The answer may have something to do 
with William Rothstein's argument that an interpretation is not merely 
an analysis, with its inherent risks of pedantry or didacticism, but a 
synthesis of analytical truth and dramatic truth. Indeed, as Rothstein 
points out, Schenker substituted Synthese for Analyse (218), but in 
considering voice-leading structure as the ultimate synthesis, Schenker 
"is not an unerring guide to the performer" (219). In a series of 
stylistically sensitive examples from Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, and 
Brahms, Rothstein demonstrates how the performer must also be like 
a dramatic actor, in choosing just what to reveal and when. He 
concludes, "The performer's task is to provide the listener with a vivid 
experience of the work, not an analytical understanding of it," and 
"Analysis, transmuted by imagination and a certain amount of cunning, 
can help to inspire that magic without which even the greatest music 
cannot fully live" (238). 
While I agree wholeheartedly with these ideals, the interesting 
issues arise from details of their application. For example, Rothstein 
considers three diatonic motifs as basic building blocks for Beethoven's 
Piano Sonata in A major, Op. 101 (shown in a series of examples on 
pp. 223-26). Motif 1 is a stepwise motion through a fourth. When 
"highlighted in a high register" (222; my characterization would be 
"strategically marked"), the motif may "be identified as representing 
the divine, or possibly human striving for the divine" (226). For this 
reason, not every instance of the motif should be "brought out" in 
performance, and one should "reveal its significance gradually" (227), 
as Beethoven does. Therefore, in playing the first measure of the work, 
it would be "the height of insensitivity" and would "spoil the effect of 
the opening altogether" to highlight the slightly chromatic descending 
stepwise fourth in the tenor voice (227). Given the motivic and 
dramatic argument Rothstein provides, such advice is clearly logical 
and expressively sound. 
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But what if one has an alternative conception of the thematic 
language of the movement and its expressive significance? In my 
interpretation of the first movement, I noted the importance of a 
marked chromatic reversal in the "second theme" (or the musical idea 
beginning in m. 16, which Rothstein considers a "cadential theme" 
[227, note 17]), and I explored its significance for the work.15 Like 
Rothstein, I would consider the tenor voice in m. 1 to hint at my motif, 
and purely on that basis, I would not suggest its being "brought out. " 
But in analyzing mm. 1-2 as a quintessential expression of the pastoral, 
I also noted the contribution of each voice to that' 'package," with the 
wedge between the soprano/alto and tenor suggesting a kind of 
Romantic' 'flowering," and the D # to D q in the tenor transforming the 
opening E major chord, potentially heard as tonic, into a V7/IV in a 
familiar "yielding" progression. The result is that A major, soon 
enough understood as the tonic, receives a subdominant "flavoring" 
quite suited to its pastoral character for the movement (one can 
compare the opening of the "Pastoral" Piano Sonata in D major, Op. 
28, which features a less elliptical move in literally opening with 
I-V7/IV-IV6/4). Returning to Op. 101, if that tenor line has multiple 
roles-both immediately (as wedge to the soprano and alto, and as 
subdominant flavoring) as well as more distantly (hinting of resignation 
to come through chromatic reversal)-then I am less likely to disguise 
its appearance in performance. And in that sense, my performance 
would indeed reflect an analysis, a slightly different one from 
Rothstein'S, and perhaps insensitive only to ears more convinced of his 
or still another's analysis. 
The drama of motivic coherence based on diatonic pitch cells is 
simply less interesting to me than the drama of marked motives and 
other thematized aspects of musical structure that, to be sure, rely on 
an underlying coherent scheme, but are not strictly about that scheme. 
(Analogously, my interest in the Schubert Impromptu analyzed by Cone 
does not reside primarily in the treatment of the agogic accent that 
forms the basis of Cone's "story" for the work [250]). Although I 
would hope that my interpretation, if suitably performed, could have 
15Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven, 91-104. 
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the "magic" Rothstein recommends, it would depend as much on the 
listener being convinced of that interpretation as on my actually 
achieving it in performance. In addition, my gradual unfolding of 
significance in a dramatically-conceived plot might well increase the 
distance between my portrayal of an analysis and the analysis itself. For 
these reasons, the theorist with a prior commitment to a particular 
analysis of a work is going to be the hardest critical ear to please. 
"A Curious Moment in Schumann's Fourth Symphony: Structure as 
the Fusion of Affect and Intuition" 
But the intuitions of the performer may well lead to analytical 
confirmation, as David Epstein painstakingly demonstrates. He begins 
by considering affects as structured phenomena, precisely delineated in 
art works, but problematic to describe in language: 
More important than describing affect is to seek the mechanisms 
by which it is structured .... [A]s we interpret structures, 
reveal them within the time processes by which music flows, we 
deal simultaneously with affect. As we shape structures, 
modulating the intensities that demarcate them, we likewise 
shape affect. (130) 
His case study involves the recapitulation of the first movement of 
Schumann's Fourth Symphony (m. 297), which is definitive neither 
tonally nor thematically, but nevertheless counts as recapitulatory 
because of its thematic culmination of events in the development into 
a sixteen-bar periodic theme and its preliminary resolution of the 
dominant pedal. The problem is the sfp that one encounters in the 1851 
version of the score. Most conductors ignore the implied subito piano 
in order to bring out the "ebullience" of the theme. 
Epstein's detective work with the autograph reveals Schumann's 
intentions to be other than a subito piano here. To begin with, the 
lower strings are clearly marked mf, implying a greater dynamic value 
for the melodic line (the second violins play the theme in octaves, and 
what might have appeared to be a "dim" in the autograph is actually 
Book Reviews 103 
a "divisi"). Then the notorious sflp} that was placed under the violins 
and clarinets in the later version is only faintly visible, having been 
erased in the autograph of the first version. Interestingly, the m of the 
mf under the second violin theme is marked out with dark 
cross-hatching, revealing Schumann's intention that the theme be played 
forte. Like Cone, Epstein adduces analytical evidence to support his 
notational evidence. The sixteen-bar theme receives a pill f at the 
halfway mark, and it is followed by afftutti peroration of the theme on 
a dominant pedal (in this case, what I would call an "arrival" or 
"elevation" pedal, functioning rhetorically, as I have described for 
Beethoven16). Thus, the "mounting sense of overall intensity" 
constitutes a Steigerung, and to begin the recapitulation forte, given its 
thinner orchestration, would still provide room for a progressive 
intensification while preserving the character of the culminating theme. 
The sfp, added later, could therefore be understood not as implying a 
subito piano, but rather as indicating an expressive accent to mark both 
the peak of the dominant preparation's crescendo and the elided 
"inception of the intense singing melody" launching the recapitulation. 
Epstein claims that his analytical (and historical) investigation comes 
after the fact of a performance intuition, and that the latter is a response 
to the affective character of the music at that point-an "intuitive 
feeling of the music" that is at the same time "indissolubly tied to the 
formal embodiment of structural detail" (148). In this way, not only is 
affect viewed as internally structured and precise (the claim stemming 
from the scientific literature on brain laterality cited at the outset), but 
"the shaping of structure concurrently ... shape[s] the affective sense 
of the music's flow" (148). 
I would add only that occasionally the process of discovery goes in 
the other direction: we may find a notational indication that goes 
against the grain of our stylistic competency, and in the course of 
performing the passage according to its unusual or "marked" 
indications, we may come to realize a new and eminently valid 
affective meaning that goes beyond our otherwise "unmarked" 
(default) mode of performing it. The use of unexpected performance 
16Ibid., 15. 
104 Indiana Theory Review, Vol. 17/1 
indications (for example, Beethoven's dislocating dynamic and 
accentual markings, which introduce a willful gestural component) may 
afford a new level of "structure" that savvy performer-composers can 
exploit to further expand or articulate the range of expressive meanings 
stemming from stylistic' 'syntax," either enhancing or contradicting the 
meanings typically interpretable from harmonic and formal structure. 
Cook's essay on Furtwangler may be seen from this perspective as 
demonstrating the opposite tack, in that the flux of tempi serves not so 
much to carve out a distinct level of expressive meaning (as, say, a 
choreography often serves as a counterpart to the rhythm and structure 
of the musical work appropriated for a ballet), but rather to underline 
the expressive significance of the formal structure itself. Clearly, the 
art of performance is susceptible to a variety of artistically fruitful 
approaches. 
"Playing in Time: Rhythm, Metre, and Tempo in Brahms's 
Fantasien, Ope 116" 
I turn now to John Rink's contribution, which is perhaps the most 
personal in this regard, centering on his own performance of Brahms's 
Fantasien, Op. 116. Although the sequence of events was (1) intuitive 
preparation for performance, culminating in a public recital, (2) 
subsequent detailed analysis, and (3) "reassessment of the performance 
in light of the analysis" (255), Rink's reconstruction slights the first 
and last stages in pursuing a rather focused analysis of rhythm, meter, 
and especially tempo. Drawing on Jonathan Dunsby's claim that Op. 
116 is an integrated "multi-piece, ,,17 Rink follows David Epstein and 
Allen Forte in pursuing proportional tempo relationships between the 
seven pieces and their contrasting sections. 18 Although disagreeing in 
17Jonathan Dunsby, "The Multi-Piece in Brahms: Fantasien Op. 116," in Brahms: 
Biographical, Documentary and Analytical Studies, ed. Robert PascalI (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 167-89. 
18David Epstein, Beyond Orpheus: Studies in Musical Structure (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1979), 75-95; idem, "Brahms and the Mechanisms of Motion: The 
Composition of Performance, , , in Brahms Studies: Analytical and Historical 
Book Reviews 105 
certain points with Epstein, Rink finds support for Epstein's claim that 
tempo changes in Brahms are bound to the simple proportional relations 
of a tactus. 19 Fortunately, a proportion no more complex than 3:2, or 
2:3, appears to suffice in those cases where motivic relationships 
(descending or ascending thirds, for example) would be heard as ideally 
"temporally aligned" with those tempo relationships. Various uses of 
hemiola support the 3:2 proportion, and indeed may have suggested it. 
Rink's averaging of sectional tempi in ten recordings of the work (with 
due "discounting [of] anomalies"!) tends to bear out his claim of the 
priority of whole-number ratios (3:2, 2:1, and 4:3). 
I will attempt not to dispute Rink's researches but rather to question 
whether proportional tempo relationships are worth all the fuss. As a 
performer, I find that my tempo choices are not usually based on an 
attempt to relate motives by ensuring their absolute tempo equivalence 
in different sections or pieces. If a motivic connection is significant 
enough, its two forms need not be played in the same tempo in order 
for me to hear the relationship, and in fact, they might profit from 
having distinctive temporalities appropriate to their affective 
environment. Furthermore, I enjoy the "freshening" effect of 
non-proportionality if the new section or piece is to be heard as shifting 
affective ground. Most performers, as Rink's own evidence suggests, 
intuitively (but not exactly) gravitate to reasonable oppositional 
relationships between tempi for sections and pieces. Granted, hemiolas 
and other metric/rhythmic constructs may suggest a specific 
proportionality, but even here affectual considerations might cause a 
performer to "nuance" or "massage" the otherwise simple proportions 
of 2: 1 or 3:2. 
I recall hearing a performance of the Brahms Requiem in which I 
found nearly all the tempi to be wrong-not because I was calculating 
proportions, but because they seemed out of character with my 
Perspectives, ed. G. Bozarth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 191-226; and Allen 
Forte, "The Structural Origin of Exact Tempi in the Brahms-Haydn Variations," The 
Music Review 18, no. 2 (1957): 138-49. 
19Epstein, "Brahms and the Mechanisms of Motion," 204-5. 
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understanding of the pacing for particular kinds of thematic structures 
or topics, based on their gestural character. The possible danger of 
analytical studies such as Rink's is in their promotion of an orthodoxy 
of performance in which certain aspects of structure predominate, to the 
potential detriment of others. Bringing out motivic and rhythmic/metric 
structure is a worthy goal, but does it really require, if not exact tempi, 
exact proportionality of tempi? And even in cases where one might 
analytically agree with a proportional treatment, need the realization in 
performance be exact to be effective? 
The latter part of Rink's essay moves to questions of local phrase 
and metric structure, with salutary recommendations for performance 
to achieve, for example, "a progression from latent through emergent 
to manifest states" (273) with respect to metric implications. When 
multiple or ambiguous accentuation is in evidence, as in the middle 
section of Op. 116, no. 2, "the performer is advised to refer 
simultaneously to as many different organisational schemes in operation 
at a given point as possible," with the resulting' 'twisting and turning" 
creating a "floating effect, a metrical void, a kaleidoscopic temporal 
'neutrality' clearly intended by Brahms" (273).20 But in general, Rink's 
suggestions echo Rothstein's in terms of not effacing the notated meter, 
even while maximizing the energy from the conflict with an alternative 
grouping (276-77).21 
"Performance and Analysis: Interaction and Interpretation" 
In his contribution, Joel Lester is a bit more flexible in 
distinguishing between analytical decisions that involve "indisputable 
aspects of structure" and those that are more interpretative: 
20runk (277) also cites C. Cai's similar recommendation for performance in 
"Brahms' Short, Late Piano Pieces-Opus Numbers 116-119: A Source Study, an 
Analysis and Performance Practice" (ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1986),378. 
21Rink's brief concluding section relates these suggestions to the tradition of the free 
fantasia, stemming from C. P. E. Bach, with regard to the performance of passages 
lacking barlines or specified meter. The analogy is loose, but perhaps relevant to those 
passages that appear metrically free in the Brahms. 
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Interpretative analytical statements . . . do not describe 
universals. Rather, they concern a particular conceptual shaping 
of the piece realized in analysis and . . . possibly in 
performance as well. ... [I]nterpretative decisions often reveal 
different strategies in realizing the piece. (212) 
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Although interpretative analytical statements may appear fuzzy, they 
have the "potential to refocus analytical activity" toward less 
considered structural aspects (213). In this way, performance can 
become, or at least contribute to, an analytical activity. And since many 
interpretations may satisfy the score and its "indisputable aspects," 
performers may share as equals with theorists in "defining multiple 
strategies for interpreting pieces" (214). Indeed, Lester begins his 
essay by noting the striking lack of references to actual performances 
in works purporting to address the relationship between analysis and 
performance,22 and he concludes that the relationship between analysts 
and performers is much too one way, with theorists analyzing the 
score, not some rendition of it, and then prescribing an interpretation 
based on that analysis (197). 
A striking example of the extent to which issues resolved in theory 
are often still open to varying interpretations in performance is the 
status of hypermeter in a prototypical example, the opening "Blue 
Danube" waltz. As Lester notes, this waltz appears as an 
unproblematic example of nested hypermeter in Rothstein's book on 
phrase rhythm.23 Accordingly, the final cadence occurs on the 
"weaker" third beat (measure) of a four-bar hypermeasure. Whereas 
22 Among the distinguished culprits are Donald Francis Tovey, Companion to 
Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonatas (London: Associated Board of the Royal Schools of 
Music, 1931); Heinrich Schenker, "Johann Sebastian Bach: Sechs Sonaten fiir Violine, 
Sonate III, Largo," Das Meisterwerk in der Musik, vol. 1 (Miinchen: Drei Masken 
Verlag, 1925), 63-73; Edward T. Cone, Musical Form and Musical Peiformance (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1968); and Wallace Berry, Musical Structure and Peiformance 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
23William Rothstein, Phrase Rhythm in Tonal Music (New York: Schirmer Books, 
1989), 8. 
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Anton Paulik interprets it that way in a 1956 performance, Eugene 
Ormandy's 1966 recording places the strongest hypermetric accent on 
the cadence. Lester points out that the former promotes continuity with 
the following waltz (the energy of the cadence spills over into the next 
waltz), while the latter serves to separate the two waltzes (the second 
waltz "begins once again from a relatively low point of activity' ') 
(207). 
Other examples point out alternatives by distinguished performers 
with respect to musical form and structure and to the relationship of 
voice leading to musical form. For Lester, the issues that these 
incompatible but musically motivated performances raise "have barely 
been broached, let alone resolved, in the sphere of performance" (207). 
"Expression in Performance: Generativity, Perception, and Semiosis" 
One scholar who has been exploring the issue of expression in 
experimental research of performance dynamics and timing is Eric 
Clarke. His examples are multiple performances, by two different 
pianists each time, of the Chopin Prelude in E minor, Op. 28, no. 4, 
and the Beethoven Bagatelle, WoO 60. The differences between 
performances by the same pianist, and the average differences between 
pianists, reflect often divergent analyses of form, as we have seen in 
Lester's example, but here the data on each performance is mapped 
with respect to precise details of dynamics and tempo (unlike the more 
informal surveys of performances by Cook and Rink). 
My summary of the essay's theoretical claims will sacrifice detail 
in the interest of accessibility. The thrust of the article is that Peirce's 
semiotic theory (icon, index, symbol) can help ground an approach to 
expression in performance where generative approaches, integrated 
energy profiles, and narrative/dramatic analogies fail. Briefly, in 
Clarke's view, generative approaches assume that expression is detected 
as deviation from a norm, or more strongly, as deviation from the 
notated score; integrated energy profiles (associated with the work of 
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Neil Todd24), based on the hierarchical mapping (and synthesis) of 
changes in pitch, tempo, dynamics, articulation, timbre, and the like, 
yield energy frequencies that directly correspond to expression; and 
narrative and dramatic approaches emphasize differences of character, 
mood, and narrative-as opposed to structural implications-as primary 
bases for the expressive contrasts between performances. Each of these 
approaches is inadequate because it fails to address the "diversity and 
multiplicity of function" (26) of expressive nuances in performance. 
One way to address that diversity is to recognize that nuances can 
function iconically (as in the' 'direct relationship between the degree of 
slowing and the depth of hierarchical embedding" of segments), 
indexically (as in the "physical effort required to produce the music"), 
and more rarely for performance, symbolically (as in the characteristic 
features of an historical performance style) (27-28). 
Clarke recognizes that even small nuances can have profound 
consequences for interpretation. Such nuances function not merely as 
directly energetic expressive events but as "clues" that enable us to 
reconstruct a performer's particular conception of the work's structure 
(whether or not the performer is able to explain that conception), as 
well as a range of characterizations, physical motions, narratives, and 
stylistic competencies (51). His experimental data of two pianists 
performing the Chopin lead him to the conclusion that 
an aggregation of local expressive details can have quite 
far-reaching effects in terms of the overall interpretation that is 
created. Each of these features has little or no impact in itself, 
but considered together, and in their specific contexts, they 
collectively point towards two distinct interpretations. This is 
something that none of the existing theories of expression can 
adequately handle: the small-scale changes have no systematic 
and pervasive relationship to the underlying structure, as a 
generative theory would predict, and they are too minimal in 
their energetic consequences to be able to change the global 
24Neil Todd, "The Auditory 'Primal Sketch': A Multiscale Model of Rhythmic 
Grouping," Journal of New Music Research 23, no. 1 (1994): 25-70. 
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energy distribution, as the energy flux approach would require. 
Rather, they constitute a relatively sparse collection of indicators 
which function as the clues for two different conceptions of the 
piece, not as their empirical determinants. (36) 
While I applaud Clarke's reasons for grounding his expressive 
theory in semiotics, I find it odd that he downplays the role of the 
symbolic in performance nuance. The argument for nuances as clues 
for higher-level conceptions of the piece suggests that their function is 
more than is entailed by Clarke's conception of the iconic or indexical, 
as described earlier. Given their role in helping clarify for the listener 
a performer's conception of musical structure and form, they would 
qualify as conventional for the simple reason that they are mediating, 
and are mediated by, the processing and interpretation of stylistic 
conventions at a higher level. (I will claim below that gesture also has 
higher-level, symbolic consequences.) 
The energetic flux approach is more purely indexical, in my view, 
and that is surely one of its limitations. I suspect Clarke would agree, 
since one of his criticisms of Todd's theory is that it "depend[s] on a 
directness between expressive sign and structural object which all but 
eliminates the fertile distance that semiotics celebrates" (51). The play 
of mediation between sign and object is a characteristic feature of the 
symbolic (and it also suggests Peirce's chain of interpretants that Clarke 
alludes to in his invocation of connotative meaning [28]). Indeed, that 
play is one reason why icons and indices are so rarely "pure. ,,25 
Nevertheless, Clarke recognizes a "substrate" of directness between 
expressive sign and object that studies in performance, motion, and the 
involvement of the human body have recently been exploring. It is to 
a survey of these efforts that I now turn. 
25Umberto Bco, in fact, argues that iconic signs may rely on a (symbolic) convention 
of similarity, that iconism is not a single phenomenon, and that we would do better to 
avoid typologies of signs and instead consider modes of producing sign functions (A 
Theory of Semiotics [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976], 191-217). I find it 
useful in this regard to speak of the iconic as one of several possible motivations for the 
creation or interpretation of a sign or signifying process. 
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"Musical Motion and Performance: Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspective s" 
The pursuit of expressiveness in experiences of movement in music 
and performance motivates this essay by Patrick Shove and Bruno H. 
Repp. Their exhaustive survey of recent experimental and other 
literature on musical motion breaks down into four parts: "(1) the 
source of motion; (2) the organisation of motion; (3) the character, or 
quality, of motion; and (4) the listener's perception and response to 
motion" (55). 
After considering proposals on how musical motion may be implied 
by rhythm or by pitch,26 they conclude that not all changes in musical 
parameters constitute motion (contra Wallace Berry27). For example, a 
change in texture is not "ecologically" experienced as motion any 
more than is the change in texture on a car after a hailstorm (57-58).28 
The ecological perspective comes from the work of J. J. Gibson29 and 
reflects a human constraint on our ability to perceive change at either 
end of the time scale as movement (we also cannot perceive the 
movement of molecules in stationary objects). The commitment to 
ecological motion leads the authors to the fundamental query "Why 
have so many theorists failed to acknowledge that musical movement 
26Notably Christopher Hasty's work on continuity and succession, "Rhythm in 
Post-Tonal Music: Preliminary Questions of Duration and Motion," Journal of Music 
Theory 25, no. 2 (1981): 183-216. 
27Wallace Berry, Structural Functions in Music (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1967), 8. 
28Although one might argue that in certain styles (e.g., Stravinsky's) frequent changes 
of texture' establish a rhythm that constitutes movement and that abrupt changes of texture 
may potentially be understood as implying the movement that would metaphorically 
underlie a shift of "scene." 
29J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1966), and The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1979). 
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is, among other things, human movement?" (58).30 The consequences 
of Gibson's theories of visual perception for movement research are 
reviewed, with the pickup of relational invariants also being applicable 
to hearing perception, as in the work of Runeson and Frykholm.31 Their 
principle, the Kinematic Specification of Dynamics, is that' 'movements 
specify their causes. "32 As Shove and Repp clarify, "the kinematic 
properties of an ambient array . . . specify the dynamic factors of the 
source that generated the movement pattern" (63). They note that the 
source need not be the performer, since the ambient information 
transfers readily to an "imagined musical object" (63), and that "forms 
of music embody relational invariants specific to natural classes of 
movement, including those symptomatic of human emotional states" 
(64). 
The authors turn next to the work of Eduard Sievers, Gustav 
Becking, and Alexander Truslit,33 three German pioneers in the 
exploration of movement types, represented as curves, and applied to 
composers or works (65-72). The curves are based, in Becking's case, 
on approaches to gravity ("as something to be overcome, to adapt to, 
or to be denied" [69]) or, in Truslit's case, on musical dynamics and 
timings found in the sound pattern itself (and represented by open, 
closed, and winding curves that "portray the melodic dynamics in 
space, with the speed of movement and the consequent relative tension 
3<The authors' footnote at this point is the only acknowledgement in the whole book 
of Alexandra Pierce's work (see footnote 3), which I would agree is an exception to their 
generalization. 
31S. Runeson and G. Frykh01m, "Kinematic Specification of Gender and Gender 
Expression," in Event Cognition: An Ecological Perspective, ed. V. McCabe and G. J. 
Balzano (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum), 259-73. 
32Ibid., 262. 
33Eduard Sievers, Ziele und Wege der Schallanalyse (Heidelberg: Carl Winters 
Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1924); Gustav Becking, Der musikalische Rhythmus als 
Erkenntnisquelle (Augsburg: Benno Filser, 1928); and Alexander Truslit, Gestaltung und 
Bewegung in der Musik (Berlin-Lichterfelde: Chr. Friedrich Vieweg, 1938). 
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being governed mainly by the curvature of the motion path" [71]).34 
The classification of composers by Becking is reminiscent of more 
recent efforts by Manfred Clynes to specify composers' pulses as 
prototypical warpings of dynamics (amplitude) and timings for a typical 
measure. His recent study presents evidence that expert musicians 
(concert artists such as Ashkenazy and Badura-Skoda, as well as 
graduate students at lulliard and elsewhere) prefer the given composer's 
pulse over contrasting and "inappropriate" warps, when presented with 
computer-generated performances of the music of Haydn, Mozart, 
Beethoven, and Schubert. 35 
Clynes cites Becking as having first proposed the concept of the 
composer's pulse, and he faults Truslit for not appreciating Becking's 
work. 36 Shove and Repp note that Truslit's approach is closer to the 
ecological one they prefer and is a clear predecessor to the work of 
Neil Todd (mentioned in Clarke's article). They differ from Becking 
and Clynes in exploring not the microstructural level of approximately 
one-second pulses measured with finger motions but the several-second 
cycles of movements involving the whole body (75). In studying the 
"expressive body sway" of performers,37 Todd notes, in the authors' 
34The process of deriving such curves from the sounding music is remarkably similar 
to Alexandra Pierce's exercise of "contouring" a melody; see "Developing Schenkerian 
Hearing and Performance," 103-9. 
35Manfred C1ynes, "Microstructural Musical Linguistics: Composers' Pulses Are 
Liked Most by the Best Musicians," Cognition 55 (1995): 269-310. Those who heard 
C1ynes's demonstration of "preferred" computer-generated performances during the 
evening session, "Musical Microstructure in Expressive Performance," at the 1995 
Society for Music Theory conference in New York may recognize that there is an 
enormous difference between preferring one stereotyped warping over another and 
choosing to replicate that warping for every measure of a work! 
36Ibid., 275. 
37Neil Todd, "Music and Motion: A Personal View," in Proceedings of the Founh 
Rhythm Workshop: Rhythm Perception and Production (Bourges: Imprimerie Municipale, 
1992), 123-28; and "Vestibular Feedback in Musical Performance: Response to 
Somatosensory Feedback in Musical Peiformance (ed. Sundberg and Verrillo), " Music 
Perception 10, no. 3 (1993): 379-82. 
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words, that "pianists' head movements are synchronised with 
expressive tempo fluctuations in the music, such that tempo minima 
coincide with turning points in the head movement" (76). It is tempting 
to speculate, along with Todd, Shove, and Repp, that expressive 
variations in timing and dynamics represent the performer's motion and 
that the listener may interpret that motion bodily (whether actually or 
in the imagination) (76-77). 
Another experiment of Todd's might be seen to lend support to 
Furtwangler's tempo gradients (see discussion of Cook's essay, 
above).38 Todd found that listeners prefer "alternating phases of 
constant acceleration and deceleration, one cycle typically 
corresponding to a musical group or gesture" (77). Since this constancy 
of either acceleration or deceleration is characteristic of other human 
forms of motion, the connection with the perception of motion is 
tempting to make (77). 
One other field of research must be mentioned in this brief survey 
of a survey. The work of Paolo Viviani and his collaborators has 
demonstrated interesting constraints on human motion that may have 
applicability to musical motion. 39 Apparently, when drawing an ellipse 
in a single movement, the hand/arm moves faster over the flat parts and 
slower around the sharper curves, and the rate of change can be 
expressed as "a power function of trajectory curvature" (78)-in other 
words, there is a natural constraint that determines changes in speed. 
Furthermore, a point of light tracing an elliptical pattern is easier to 
track and is seen to be moving at a constant velocity only if the velocity 
is governed by that power function; ironically, tracing at a constant 
38Idem, "The Dynamics of Dynamics: A Model of Musical Expression," Journal of 
the Acoustical Society of America 91, no. 6 (1992): 3540-50; and "The Kinematics of 
Musical Expression," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 97, no. 3 (1995): 
1940-49. 
39For overviews, see Paolo Viviani, "Common Factors in the Control of Free and 
Constrained Movements," in Attention and Peifonnance XlI, ed. M. Jeannerod 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1990), 345-73; and P. Viviani and G. Laissard, "Timing 
Control in Motor Sequences," in The Development of Timing Control and Temporal 
Organization in Coordinated Action (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1991), 1-36. 
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velocity is perceived as changing in speed (78).40 Thus, there are 
measurable biological constraints on human motion, which may help 
ensure the interpretation of motion by a similarly attuned perceptual 
system. As Shove and Repp point out, this scientific evidence may 
support Truslit's results: 
What Truslit evidently did was to convert the velocity 
information available in the temporal and dynamic 
microstructure of music into arm movements with a matching 
spatial trajectory whose direction also took the melodic pitch 
contour into account. (78) 
What scientific evidence cannot do, however, is specify the artistic 
or stylistic constraints by which we modify performance beyond the 
biological level. Nevertheless, the movement studies cited by Shove and 
Repp are remarkable in their support of the authors' thesis: that we 
need to consider much more seriously the contributions of human 
movement to musical motion. If the human perceptual system is so 
highly attuned to the specifics of the human motion system, then that 
has obvious ramifications for performance, as well as for perception. 
We may come to realize the extent to which "embodiment" of musical 
meaning is not only a cognitive metaphor but a direct engagement of 
the body in the production and interpretation of a highly organized 
musical signal. We may also find ourselves examining the consequences 
of musical gesture as a richly-formed Gestalt that cannot be simply 
built up or unpacked according to our music-theoretical separations of 
its component parts (metric placement, rhythm, accent, articulation, 
dynamics, timing, voice-leading implications, topical character, etc.). 
What might be the consequences of such a radical reorientation for 
music theory and its analytical systems? And how might performances 
conceived from this direction negotiate traditional analytical values to 
achieve the synthesis and the magic that Rothstein champions? 
40p. Viviani and N. Stucchi, "Biological Movements Look Uniform: Evidence of 
Motor-Perceptual Interactions," Journal o/Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Peiformance 18, no. 3 (1992): 603-23. 
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Will we find new grounding for claims of musical affective meaning 
from the perspective of biological constraints and universals pertaining 
to movement and perception? I suspect so, and yet I would not like to 
see movement and gesture relegated to a "substrate" position based on 
their presumed "directness" of meaning. Eric Clarke's studies 
demonstrate the power of tiny nuances to reflect major structural 
organization, and as I argued above, the semiotic significance of 
movement is already quite symbolic to the extent that a rhetorical or 
structural function is involved. 41 This is a very different situation from 
the mindless reiteration of a composer's pulse, which at best conveys 
an attitude, or stance, and does not flex to provide for the subtle needs 
of expressive performance, at least in the sense Clarke is exploring. 
Likewise, opening or thematic gestures may contain whole worlds, with 
implications for the character of a whole work that are gradually 
explored, even independently of the typical pitch/rhythmic content 
analyzed by traditional motivic approaches. 42 
That our brains can cognitively represent and categorize movements 
means that we can thematize them and play with them in aesthetic 
contexts. The artistic "capturing" or "marking" of movement is part 
of what we mean by artistic gesture,43 which may provide a different 
rationale for those performance movements considered by Lester as 
expressive nuances beyond the "indisputable" content of a work, or by 
Clarke as primarily clues to the performer's conception of the work's 
structure. Thus, one of the foundational tasks facing performance 
studies is the teasing out of the varieties of musical movement and the 
multiple functions attributable to each. This issue goes far beyond 
performance studies, however, as it exposes one of the lacunae in the 
discipline of music theory itself. What we deem to be analytically 
41That movements may become symbolic is a point David Lidov makes in his 
important article "Mind and Body in Music," Semiotica 66, no. 1 (1987): 69-97. 
421 consider such an example in "Schubert the Progressive: The Role of Resonance 
and Gesture in the Piano Sonata in A, D. 959," Integral 7 (1993): 38-81. 
43 As David Lidov points out in "The Discourse of Gesture, " a paper delivered to 
the 1993 national meeting of the Semiotic Society of America in St. Louis. 
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relevant to a listener, even how we conceive of musical meaning, must 
take into account the contribution of musical gesture as marked 
movement. Human motion, then, may be seen as relevant not merely 
for performance but also for our affective and analytical representations 
of music itself. 
Afterword 
A few remarks about the organization of this book are in order 
before I close. Each essay has its own bibliography, which I find more 
helpful than an omnibus bibliography in the back, especially for the 
more scientific articles, since more numerous reference lists are not 
scattered among entries in a general bibliography. The author-date 
citation used is becoming standard practice, and it helps enormously by 
reducing the number of footnotes (which are conveniently provided at 
the bottom of the page). I would encourage more music journals and 
books to adopt this practice, and also to insist on a list of references at 
the end of each article so they need not be laboriously extracted from 
the notes. Although there is an index of names, an index of concepts 
is unfortunately not included. The authors occasionally cross-reference 
one another, and Rink's excellent preface features capsule summaries 
of each essay, with cross references for a few points made by more 
than one author, but the reader will have difficulty tracking down every 
discussion of a given issue or concept. This is a shame, considering the 
fruitful overlaps that do occur (only a few of which I've had 
opportunity to highlight in my review). In every other respect, the book 
is a handsome production. 
